

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
DODE-00 EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 IO-13
L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02
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SSO-00 NRC-05 /152 W
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5405
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 01532

CW MESSSGE NO. 20

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM US UR
SUBJECT: US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ROUND
SEVEN: SIXTH PLENARY MEETING, JANUARY 25, 1978

REF: GENEVA 1092

1. SUMMARY: AT SIXTH PLENARY MEETING, SOVIET DEL
RESPONDED TO U.S. JANUARY 20 STATEMENT (REFTEL), WHICH
INCLUDED COMMENTS ON SOVIET POSITION ON DECLARATION/
DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES. MAIN POINTS OF SOVIET
STATEMENT WERE THAT DECLARATION OF OVERALL PRODUCTION
CAPABILITIES IS SUFFICIENT AND THAT DECLARATION OF
INDIVIDUAL FACILITIES, ESPECIALLY THEIR LOCATIONS, WOULD
BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECURITY OF STATES PARTIES. REGARD-
ING U.S. QUESTION ON SOVIET POSITION ON CONDITIONS FOR
TREATY ENTRY-INTO-FORCE (REFTEL, PARA 5), SOVIET DEL SAID
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IT UNDERSTOOD DELS HAD AGREED ISSUE WOULD BE DISCUSSED
LATER, AFTER AGREED PROVISIONS ON SCOPE AND VERIFICA-
TION HAD BEEN FORMULATED. U.S. DEL DEFERRED COMMENTS
ON SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET STATEMENT UNTIL SOVIET DEL HAD
COMPLETED ITS RESPONSE TO U.S. JANUARY 20 STATEMENT.
END SUMMARY.

2. THE SIXTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) WAS HELD WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, JANUARY 25, AT U.S. MISSION.

3. AMBASSADOR V.I. LIKHACHEV (HEAD OF SOVIET DEL) RESPONDED TO JANUARY 20 U.S. STATEMENT (REFTEL), CRITICIZING SOVIET DEL FOR REGRESSING ON ISSUES WHICH U.S. THOUGHT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN ROUND SIX AND POINTING OUT REVISIONS IN U.S. ROUND SIX POSITIONS WHICH IT THOUGHT HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED BY SOVIET SIDE. LIKHACHEV FOCUSED HIS REMARKS PRIMARILY ON DECLARATION AND ELIMINATION/DISMANTLING OF FACILITIES (SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLES VI AND VII, SEPTTEL). HE PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY STATING THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAD BEEN "CLEARLY" AND "PRECISELY" PUT FORWARD IN ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION. HE SAID THESE ARTICLES PROVIDE THAT STATE PARTIES SHOULD DECLARE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES WITHIN THEIR POSSESSION WHICH CAN PRODUCE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AND HOW IT INTENDS TO DESTROY OR DISMANTLE THEM. HE ADDED THAT THEY HAD SPECIFIED A DEFINITE DATE (NO LATER THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD SPECIFIED FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKS) IN THEIR DRAFT CONVENTION, BUT SAID THAT STATES COULD MAKE THESE DECLARATIONS ANYTIME BEFORE THAT DATE. LIKHACHEV THEN STATED THAT, IN LIGHT OF THESE PROVISIONS, IT WAS HARDLY POSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET

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SIDE DID NOT BELIEVE FACILITIES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS EARLIER THAN SEVEN YEARS AFTER ENTRY-INTO-FORCE OF THE CONVENTION.

4. REGARDING THE U.S. CRITICISM THAT USE OF THE WORD "EXCLUSIVELY" IN SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE VII CREATED A LOOP-HOLE (REFTEL, PARA 8), LIKHACHEV MAINTAINED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD EXPLAINED THEIR USE OF THIS TERM IN THE COURSE OF THEIR PRESENTATION BUT REITERATED FOR CLARIFICATION: A FACILITY WHICH ONLY PRODUCES CHEMICAL AGENTS DESIGNED FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES AND NO CHEMICALS WHICH COULD BE USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IS, BY SOVIET DEFINITION, "DESIGNED EXCLUSIVELY" TO PRODUCE THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AND, THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING. THIS WOULD ALSO BE THE CASE FOR FACILITIES SPECIALLY PRODUCING CASINGS FOR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS OR WHERE SUCH CASINGS ARE FILLED WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS OR EQUIPPED WITH BINARY OR MULTI-COMPONENT WEAPON DEVICES. FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCE BOTH CHEMICALS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AS WELL AS CHEMICAL AGENTS DESIGNED FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT BE DESTROYED OR DISMANTLED -- ONLY THOSE COMPONENTS OF THE

FACILITY WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL FOR PRODUCTION OF THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT IN MANY COUNTRIES SUCH COMBINED FACILITIES COMPRISE THE MAJORITY OF FACILITIES FORMING THE AGGREGATE CAPABILITY FOR CHEMICAL AGENTS AND DELIVERY DEVICES. FOR THIS REASON, THEY HAVE PROPOSED THE FORMULATION "... DESIGNED OR USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRODUCING ..." IN THEIR DRAFT ARTICLE VII.

5. REGARDING DECLARATION OF FACILITIES, LIKHACHEV STATED THAT HE WAS IN COMPLETE AND FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE CONVENTION SHOULD RESULT IN AN INCREASE RATHER THAN A DECREASE IN THE SECURITY OF STATES PARTIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT: (A) IN SOME COUNTRIES, MILITARY
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CHEMICAL PRODUCTION WAS CARRIED OUT SEPARATELY FROM

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
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L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5406
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 01532

CW MESSAGE NO. 20

PEACEFUL CHEMICAL PRODUCTION; (B) IN OTHER COUNTRIES,

MILITARY CHEMICAL PRODUCTION MAY BE INTERSPERSED IN SMALL PORTIONS THROUGHOUT THE GENERAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; (C) IN STILL OTHER COUNTRIES, PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES MAY BE CLOSELY CONNECTED TO OTHER, NON-CHEMICAL, MILITARY PRODUCTION. THE MOST WIDESPREAD SITUATION, IN HIS VIEW, IS THAT MILITARY CHEMICAL PRODUCTION MAY BE CARRIED OUT IN ALL THREE OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED WAYS. LIKHATCHEV THEN ASKED, APART FROM THE "INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES" ASSOCIATED WITH EACH STATE PARTY DECLARING EACH FACILITY THAT PRODUCED SOME CHEMICAL AGENT OR SOME MEANS FOR ITS COMBAT USE, WOULDN'T THERE BE "UNEQUAL SITUATION" AMONG STATES PARTIES AS WELL AS BETWEEN STATES THAT ARE PARTIES AND STATES WHICH ARE NOT. SOME STATES, HE MAINTAINED, WOULD ONLY HAVE TO DECLARE VERY LARGE FACILITIES CONCENTRATED IN A FEW LOCATIONS, WHILE OTHERS WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE AN EXTENSIVE NETWORK

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OF SMALL FACILITIES INTERSPERSED WITHIN BOTH THE MILITARY AND PEACEFUL CIVILIAN SECTORS, THUS DISCLOSING THINGS HAVING NO RELATION TO THE CONVENTION. LIKHATCHEV STATED THAT THE VARYING DEGREES OF CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY CHEMICAL PRODUCTION IN EACH DIFFERENT COUNTRY WAS OF "SUBSTANTIAL SIGNIFICANCE". HE POSTULATED A CASE IN WHICH A SPECIFIC LEVEL OF PRODUCTION CAPABILITY WOULD BE THE CRITERION FOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A FACILITY WOULD HAVE TO BE DECLARED. STATES POSSESSING LARGE PLANTS AND, THEREFORE, HAVING MORE CONCENTRATED PRODUCTION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DECLARE ALL OR ALMOST ALL OF THEIR MILITARY CHEMICAL PLANTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, STATES WITH FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCE AT LEVELS BELOW THOSE ESTABLISHED BY THE CRITERION FOR DECLARATIONS PERHAPS WOULD NOT HAVE TO DECLARE ANYTHING AT ALL ALTHOUGH THEIR TOTAL CAPABILITY MIGHT EQUAL OR SURPASS THE CAPABILITY OF THE STATE POSSESSING THE LARGE FACILITIES. ALL THESE DIFFICULTIES, LIKHATCHEV ASSERTED, WOULD BE FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES OF COUNTRIES.

6. LIKHATCHEV ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER A POSSIBLE PROBLEM RESULTING FROM THE DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTION OF FACILITIES WITHIN COUNTRIES (I.E., CONCENTRATED IN ONE OR SEVERAL LOCATIONS OR WIDELY DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT A COUNTRY; NEAR TO BORDERS OR FAR AWAY) AND PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT ARISE BECAUSE SOME STATES PARTIES WOULD BE "SURROUNDED" BY OTHER PARTIES WHILE OTHERS MIGHT BORDER ON NON-PARTIES. HE EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO STATE THAT NON-PARTIES WOULD "GAIN GREAT MILITARY ADVANTAGE" IN A CONFLICT WITH A STATE PARTY WHICH HAD DECLARED ITS FACILITIES BECAUSE THE NON-PARTY COULD WAGE CHEMICAL WAR ON

THE STATE PARTY WITHOUT EVER USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS SIMPLY
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BY BOMBING ONE OF THE STATE PARTY'S OWN DECLARED FACILITIES. HE ADDED THAT THIS WOULD REPRESENT A DIRECT THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF STATES PARTIES.

7. LIKHATCHEV ALSO BRIEFLY MENTIONED THAT MORALE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS MIGHT RESULT FROM STATES' DECLARATIONS, SAYING "POPULATIONS MIGHT PANIC, CITIZENS MAY TAKE FLIGHT, ETC., IF STATES ARE REQUIRED TO PUBLISH INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF PLANTS WHICH PRODUCE LETHAL GAS." IN CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS ON THESE ISSUES, HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT TAKES CARE OF THESE PROBLEMS BY PROVIDING FOR DECLARATION OF PLANS FOR DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING OF THE INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER CAPABILITIES STATES PARTIES HAVE FOR PRODUCING MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE. HE SAID THIS WOULD INVOLVE PROVIDING INFORMATION ON CAPABILITIES, I.E., THE TOTAL QUANTITY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS A STATE IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING. THE NUMBER OF FACILITIES AND THEIR LOCATION IS RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT.

8. LIKHATCHEV EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT U.S. HAD NOT RECALLED THE PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN DELS REGARDING THE SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY-INTO-FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD UNDERSTOOD THIS ISSUE WOULD BE DISCUSSED LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AFTER THE QUESTIONS RELATING TO SCOPE AND VERIFICATION HAD BEEN SOLVED. AMBASSADOR A.S. FISHER (HEAD OF U.S. DEL) ACCEPTED THIS UNDERSTANDING AND DEFERRED COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET STATEMENT UNTIL SOVIET DEL HAD COMPLETED ITS RESPONSE TO THE U.S. JANUARY 20 STATEMENT.

9. NEXT PLENARY MEETING WAS SET FOR AFTERNOON, JANUARY 27, SORENSON

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Message Attributes

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